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Abstract
Music piracy is a double-edged sword for the music industry. On the one hand, it hurts
record sales. On the other hand, it increases sales of its complements. To quantify the
effect of music piracy, I construct a unique survey data set and use a Bayesian method
to estimate the demand for music and iPods, and find three things. First, music piracy
decreases music sales by 24% to 42%. Second, music piracy contributes 12% to iPod sales.
Finally, counterfactual experiments show that Apple’s revenue could increase by $36 per
student if music were free.
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1 Introduction
The belief that music piracy hurts record sales prevails in the music industry.1 In 1999, record
sales started to decline after more than a decade of steady growth. The very same year, Nap-
ster, the first peer-to-peer (P2P) software used to pirate music, began operations, which music
industry representatives, such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and
the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), argue is no coincidence. A
number of economists have combined data on illegal downloading from a variety of sources with
data on album sales and found that music piracy has led to a decline in the latter (see Blackburn
(2004), Liebowitz (2006), Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004), Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Zentner
(2006).) Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) disagree, however, arguing that music piracy “al-
lows users to learn about music they would not otherwise be exposed to” and thus may actually
boost record sales. They construct a unique data set using weekly volumes of illegal downloads
and show that music piracy’s effect on record sales “ is not statistically distinguishable from
zero. The economic effect of the point estimate is also small.” These contradictory findings cast
doubt on the music industry’s belief in the damaging effects of music piracy. Whether music
piracy hurts record sales remains an open empirical question.
Although, as noted, many economists argue that music piracy hurts record sales, Oberholzer-
Gee and Strumpf (2010) argue that it can increase revenue from music complements such as
concerts. When music piracy drives the effective price of an album down to nearly zero, more
consumers become familiar with the artist’s music, thus driving up demand for concerts. Mor-
timer, Nosko, and Sorensen (2012) show empirically that music piracy has a significant effect
on concert demand, particularly for small artists. Concerts are not the only music complements
to benefit from music piracy. Figure 1 suggests that the iPod, the most popular MP3 player
by far, has gained considerably from such piracy. Although record sales have declined by more
than 25% since Napster was launched, Apple has seen exponential growth in iPod sales since the
device was introduced in 2001. Revenue from iPod sales grew from $344 million in 2003 to $7.6
billion in 2006. If there is strong complementarity between music piracy and iPod sales, then
Netanel (2003) and Fisher (2004) suggest that it might be welfare-improving to have a regime
1I use music piracy and illegal downloading interchangeably in this paper.
2
 Figure 1:
RIAA and Apple Inc.: CDs Revenue Decreasing, iPods Revenue Growing in the U.S. ($
millions)
in which music piracy is legal and a government-financed fund compensates music producers
according to the download rates of their records. How much music piracy benefits the iPod sales
is another open and important empirical question.
To answer these two empirical questions, I constructed a unique conjoint data set derived
from a survey of 884 University of Minnesota undergraduates. The students were first asked to
report their demographic information and their recent consumption of both music and iPods.
Then, in the conjoint survey, they were asked to make choices about music (from both legal
and illegal sources) and iPods in 12 hypothetical situations. Green and Rao (1971) introduced
conjoint survey analysis as a way to elicit demand estimates. Conjoint survey data are also
known as stated-preference data, as opposed to revealed-preference data collected from real
world observations. There are two main advantages to the use of conjoint survey data rather
than real market data in this research. First, a conjoint survey is possibly the only way to create
a panel data set on the consumption of illegal downloads, legal music, and iPods. Because it
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is essential to ascertain the influence of any copyright regime changes in the music industry on
related products such as iPods, I require a clean panel data set on the consumption of both
music (from legal and illegal sources) and iPods. Second, use of a conjoint survey allowed the
use of instruments for illegal downloads that are unavailable in other studies for the reasons
discussed in Section 3.
Several studies argue that conjoint survey data generate reliable demand estimates,2 and
applications of conjoint survey analysis abound. For example, Leung (2012) estimates the
substitutability of street and Internet piracy of Microsoft Office in Hong Kong, and Hensher and
Louviere (1983) forecast the choice of attendance at various types of international expositions.
Hensher (1994) reviews the development of conjoint analysis’s use in estimating transportation
choice. Many multinational corporations, including Marriott, Procter & Gamble (P&G), and
General Motors, also use conjoint survey data to estimate the demand for new products (see
Green, Krieger, and Wind (2004) and Orme (2005)).
My empirical analysis consists of three parts. First, I set up a demand system with three types
of music: CDs, legally purchased songs from iTunes, and pirated songs from P2P websites. I
estimate this system of three simultaneous equations using the three-stage least-squares method.
My results contrast with those of Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), and support the belief
that music piracy hurts record sales. Second, I use the estimates from the first part to establish
a random-coefficient discrete-demand model for iPods. I follow Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch
(2005) in setting up a hierarchical Bayesian discrete-demand model, with a mixture of normal
priors, and then use a hybrid of Gibbs Sampling and the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to
implement posterior inference. These estimates indicate that music piracy boosts demand for
and sales of iPods. Third, I use the estimates from the first and second parts of the analysis
to conduct counterfactuals to predict the changes in demand for music and iPods in different
regimes. The results show that approximately 12% of Apple’s revenue comes from music piracy,
which translates into $1.1 billion using 2008 revenue figures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the current
situation of growing music piracy and declining record sales. Section 3 discusses the conjoint
2Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) and Hensher, Louviere, and Swait (1999) collect both stated-preference and
revealed-preference data on donation choice and freight shipper choice, respectively, and show that the hypothesis
of parameter equality holds for most parameters across the two data sources.
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survey data set. Sections 4 and 5 describe the set-up of the demand estimates for music iPods,
respectively, and discuss the estimation results. Section 6 reports the results of counterfactual
experiments using the results from Sections 4 and 5. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Music Piracy Growing, Record Sales Shrinking
2.1 Music Piracy is Growing
P2P technology has enhanced the ease and speed with which music can be pirated, and thus
triggered the growth of music piracy. In 1999, the first P2P software, Napster, was introduced,
and the number of music pirates has been growing ever since.
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Figure 2:
Big Champagne: Avg Simultaneous P2P Users in the U.S. Has Been Growing
People download music illegally from the Internet because the cost of doing so is low. If
the cost were even lower, even more people would engage in music piracy. Recent advances in
Internet connection speeds has reduced the time cost of pirating music over the Internet, which
has led to the further growth of music piracy. The marketing research firm Big Champagne
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reports an increasing trend in searching, clicking, and pirating music. Figure 2 shows that the
average number of simultaneous users of P2P software in the U.S. increased from 3.5 million in
August 2002 to more than 6 million in October 2006.3 This growing number of music pirates
translates into a huge number of pirated songs. The IFPI estimates that almost 20 billion songs
were illegally downloaded in 2005.
2.2 Record Sales are Shrinking
Music is important to Americans. The average American enjoys almost an hour of music every
day.4 Before Napster, a major source of such enjoyment was records. Record sales almost
quadrupled between 1990 and 1999. As we can see from Figure 1, the 1990s were the heyday
of the music industry. However, since Napster appeared on the scene in 1999, record sales have
declined by $3.6 billion.
The music industry believes that music piracy hurts record sales and has taken action based
on that belief. In 1999, the RIAA sued Napster, leading to the latter’s demise in 2001. In
addition, between 2003 and 2005, the RIAA sued approximately 11,700 individual music pirates,
despite the reputation cost of effectively suing its own customers (Associated Press (2005)).
Economists have created a variety of illegal download data sets to estimate the effect of music
piracy on record sales. Rob and Waldfogel (2006), for example, conducted a survey in a number
of universities to compile a panel data set on both illegal downloads and album consumption.
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Blackburn (2004) created music piracy panel data sets
by tracking individual illegal downloading behavior on P2P software. All of these researchers
supplement their data with aggregate record sales data from the RIAA or Nielson Soundscan.
Both Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Rob and Waldfogel (2006) run a regression of
the following form to determine the displacement effect of illegal downloads on album sales.
Ajt = Xjtβ + αDjt + jt, (1)
3There was a wave of lawsuits against individual pirates in 2003, which caused a decline in the number of
P2P users at the time. This fact motivates me to include the expected punishment as one of the covariates in
the conjoint survey as discussed in Section 3.
4See Table No.909, “Media Usage and Consumer Spending: 1993 to 2003,” in the 2000 U.S. Statistical
Abstract.
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where Ajt is the sales of album j at time t, Djt is the number of illegal downloads, and Xjt
are other covariates. Djt may be endogenous. Popular albums usually attract more downloads,
in which Djt will be positively correlated with jt, and the estimate of α will have an upward
bias. The aforementioned researchers deal with this problem by finding instruments for illegal
downloads that are not themselves related to album sales and thus not correlated with jt.
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) use the number of German high school students on vacation
as such an instrument based on the premise that German high school students spend more time
pirating music during their holidays.5 Rob and Waldfogel (2006) use the speed of students’
Internet connections as the instrument based on the assumption that students do not choose an
Internet speed based on their music preferences.
Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Blackburn (2004) find that music piracy hurts record sales.
Rob and Waldfogel (2006) find that “one (illegally) downloaded album reduces music purchases
[by] roughly one-fifth of an album.” Blackburn (2004) estimates in his counterfactuals that “the
lawsuits brought by the RIAA have resulted in an increase in album sales of approximately 2.9%
during the 23 week period after the lawsuit strategy was publicly announced.”
Table 1: US Legal Digital Music Market Growing (millions)
2004 2005 2006
Broadband lines 34 43 57
Single track downloadeds 143 353 582
Album downloads 6 16 33
Mobile subscriptions 163 174 194
Sources: IFPI “Digital Music Report” 2006 and 2007.
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), however, argue that music piracy’s effect on record
sales “is not statistically distinguishable from zero. The economic effect of the point estimate is
also small.” They argue that there may be other more important factors leading to the decline
in record sales. First, we might be seeing a shift in entertainment spending from recorded music
toward recorded movies. Second, many people may have replaced their old LPs with CDs in
the mid-1990s, thus boosting record sales in that period. By 1999, coincidentally the year that
Napster began to operate, however, they had completed their replacement process. Third, the
5Liebowitz (2007) points out that Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) make a contradictory claim in their
quasi-experiment stating that illegal downloading decreases in the summer because American college students
lose their broadband connections during their vacation. As both countries have both high school and college
students, theoretically there should be no difference in the way that school holidays affect illegal downloading.
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emergence of digital (online) music stores such as iTunes provides an even closer substitute
for CDs. Table 1 shows that the number of legal downloads of both single tracks and albums
increased by more than 50% per year from 2004 to 2006. In addition to these other factors,
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) argue that music piracy may in fact boost record sales
because it allows consumers to learn about music they would not otherwise be exposed to.
These conflicting findings lead to my first question: Does music piracy hurt record sales?
If so, by how much? To answer the question, I use a different approach from that of previous
researches. Section 3 describes the conjoint survey data set and compares the pros and cons of
this data set with these of the data sets used by others.
3 Data Collection and Description
Table 2: Percentage of U.S. Adult Population Answering YES to “Do you ever download music
files on your computer so you can play them at any time you want?”
Aug-Sep Oct June Nov May-June Feb
2001 2002 2003 2003 2004 2005
Overall 15 19 19 9 13 13
18-29 36 41 43 23 31 32
30-49 16 21 20 9 11 13
50-64 6 8 8 4 6 7
65+ 2 3 1 2 2 1
Men 19 22 23 12 17 14
Women 13 16 15 7 9 12
Source: Pew Internet Project.
I collected conjoint survey data from college students, who generally have a lower income
and greater exposure to the Internet than other age groups. As Table 2 shows, college students
also tend to download or pirate more music than other age groups.
3.1 Conjoint Survey
I conducted the survey in Fall 2007 and Spring 2008 among seven undergraduate classes. Of
the approximately 1800 students registered for these classes, 884 attended class on the day of
the survey and turned in completed surveys.
The survey focuses on one dominant brand of MP3 player, the Apple iPod, because Apple
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Table 3: Apple Dominates the MP3 Market
Brand Unit Share
Apple 72.7%
Sandisk 8.9%
Microsoft 3.2%
Creative Labs 2.9%
Samsung 2.0%
Source: NPD Group.
dominates the MP3 market. As Table 3 shows, Apple enjoys more than 70% share of the MP3
market. Sandisk, its closest competitor of Apple, sells only one-eighth of what Apple does.6
The survey comprised of two parts. The first asked students to report demographic infor-
mation and give details concerning their Internet access and music and iPod consumption pref-
erences. The second was the conjoint survey. Green and Rao (1971) were the first to introduce
conjoint analysis to the marketing field. I followed the approach of Louviere and Woodworth
(1983) in using choice-based conjoint analysis, which integrates conjoint analysis and discrete
choice analysis. The questions in conjoint surveys are not descriptive such as “How much would
you be willing to pay for an iPod?” Instead, they ask students to make concrete choices such as
“Given brand A, B, and C with different attributes and prices, which one would you buy?” Con-
joint survey data are also known as stated-preference data, as opposed to revealed-preference
data, which are collected from real market transactions.
The conjoint survey used in this study included 12 hypothetical tasks. In each task, the
respondents were given the option of listening to music on an iPod, a computer or a radio
(which I treat as an outside choice). The choices differed in the level of each of the following six
choice-specific covariates.
• Price of an iPod (varies from $30 to $650)
• Capacity of an iPod (varies from 1 gigabyte to 8 gigabytes)
• Probability of getting caught pirating music (varies from 0 to 1)
• Fine per song if caught pirating music (varies from $0 to $10,000)
6The respondents also showed a distinct preference for iPods in a trial run of the survey that included other
brands of MP3 players.
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• Price per song in iTunes (varies from $0.1 to $3)
• Price per CD (varies from $1 to $30)
There were five to ten levels for each covariate within the pre-specified range.
I followed the following three principles proposed by Sawtooth Software (2008) to draw the
levels of each covariate.
1. Minimal Overlap: Each covariate level is shown as few times as possible in a single task.
2. Level Balance: Each covariate level is shown an approximately equal number of times.
3. Orthogonality: Covariate levels are chosen independently of other attribute levels, such
that each level’s effect on utility can be measured independently of all other effects.
The student were asked to complete two sub-tasks in each of the 12 tasks. In the first sub-
task, they were asked to imagine that they did not have an iPod and then to rank the three
choices in the task. Figure 3 presents a sample of the first sub-task.
Before ranking the choices, students knew roughly what their level of music consumption
would be under each. For instance, the students who ranked the iPod as their top choice
were also those who estimated that they would buy or pirate a considerable amount of music.
In the second sub-task, I assigned the students one of two choices—iPod or computer. This
assignment may or may not have been their first choice in the first sub-task. Given their
assigned choice and associated music prices, students were then asked how they would change
their music consumption from the previous month and estimate their consumption from three
sources (CDs, iTunes and P2P websites). Figure 4 shows a sample of the second sub-task, which
was included in the conjoint survey administered to two of the seven classes, meaning that 270
students completed it.
3.2 Conjoint Survey Data versus Real Market Data
There are several advantages and disadvantages to using conjoint survey rather than real market
transaction data to estimate the demand for music and iPods.
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When you listen to music, 
Your first choice is: _________                                    Second choice is: ___________ 
 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
iPod nano 
 
$US200, 4GB 
Your computer 
  
 
Radio  
  
 
Free P2P downloading illegal. 
Fine: 
$US200/song downloaded that month 
 
Chance of getting caught per month:  
1 in 2000 songs 
 
Free P2P downloading illegal. 
Fine: 
$US50/song downloaded that month 
 
Chance of getting caught per month:  
1 in 100,000 songs 
 
 
iTunes: $ US 0.3/song 
 
CD: $5 each 
 iTunes: $ US 3/song 
 
CD: $10 each 
Free music 
Figure 3:
A Sample of the First Sub-Task
Suppose you had an iPod  last month and prices of music from 
different sources were as follows: 
 
P2P 
downloading 
Illegal Fine: $200/song Prob. Of getting caught:  
1 in 2000 songs 
iTunes $0.3/song 
CDs $5/CD 
 
 
 
What would be your music consumption from the 3 sources? 
 
P2P downloading : _______________ songs 
iTunes    : ___________songs 
CDs    : ___________CDs 
 
Figure 4:
A Sample of the Second Sub-Task
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One of the disadvantages of doing so is that conjoint analysis requires attributes to be
quantifiable, and some attributes, such as the quality of sound from an iPod and a computer,
are difficult to quantify. However, because these attributes are unlikely to vary across the
different copyright regimes I discuss in the counterfactuals section, omitting them is unlikely to
affect the results.
Some researchers have also expressed concerns about the validity of conjoint survey data.
Some consider real market data to be more reliable because it is revealed-preference data. How-
ever, since Green and Rao (1971) introduced conjoint survey analysis to the marketing area, it
has been widely adopted in the marketing literature to elicit demand estimates. As mentioned in
the introduction, applications of such analysis abound. Several studies also argue that conjoint
survey data can generate reliable demand estimates.
Among the advantages of using conjoint survey data rather than real market data in this
research were the following. First, conjoint survey was possibly the only way to create a panel
data set encompassing the consumption of illegal downloads, legal music, and iPods. Oberholzer-
Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Blackburn (2004) gather panel data sets on music piracy by tracking
individual illegal downloading behavior on a P2P network. They then combine weekly album
sales with their novel data on weekly download volumes to estimate the effect of illegal downloads
on album sales. Rob and Waldfogel (2006) carry out surveys among college students to create
a panel data set incorporating legal music consumption and illegal downloading behavior, and
then use their data set to estimate effect of piracy on record sales. However, as I argued before,
it is important to ascertain the effect of any copyright regime changes in the music industry
on other related products such as iPods. Doing so requires a clean panel data set on both the
consumption of music (both legal and illegal) and iPods. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first to construct such a panel data set using a conjoint survey.
Second, conjoint survey analysis provides good instruments. Both Oberholzer-Gee and
Strumpf (2007) and Rob and Waldfogel (2006) use an instrumental variable approach to deal
with endogeneity in Equation (1). In this paper, I use the expected probability of getting caught
and possible fines as instruments for illegal downloads. Although each affects illegal downloads,
neither has a direct effect on legal music consumption.7 However, despite serving as instruments
7I also used the price of an iTunes song, the price of a CD, and the price of an iPod as instruments for their
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for my purposes here, they would not work in other cases for two reasons. First, there is greater
variation in expected punishment in my conjoint survey than in the real world. In a conjoint
survey, the designer can vary the prices of different choices within a pre-specified range. For
instance, I vary the fine per song from $0 to $10,000, whereas the real fine is usually $10 to $50
per song. Basic econometrics tells us that a larger degree of variation in independent variables
(the expected probability of getting caught and possible fines in our case) provides more infor-
mation about their effect on the dependent variable (illegal downloads here). The second reason
is that the levels of these two covariates are drawn exogenously and independently owing to the
orthogonality principle described in the previous subsection. Hence, they do not correlate with
jt in Equation (1) and can serve as instruments for illegal downloads.
3.3 Data Description
Completed surveys were received from 884 students. Most were typical university students:
They did not have a high income, with around 90% of them earning less than $200 per week.
In addition, they reported spending an average of three to four hours a day on the Internet.
Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Data
Mean (s.d.) Min Max
Age 18.94 (1.87) 13 45
Owns an MP3 player 0.86 (0.35) 0 1
Owns an iPod 0.72 (0.45) 0 1
Number of songs on computer 2508 (4773) 0 75000
Bought a CD in past month 0.28 (0.45) 0 1
Bought songs from iTunes last month 0.32 (0.47) 0 1
Downloaded free songs last month 0.54 (0.50) 0 1
N=844.
Table 4 shows that the respondents expressed great interest in listening to music. They
reported having an average of 2508 songs on their computers. They both bought music, and
pirated it. Twenty-eight percent and 32% had bought a CD or a song from iTunes, respectively,
in the previous month. In addition, more than half (54%) of them had downloaded songs illegally
from the Internet in the previous month.
corresponding demands.
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More than 70% of the students said they owned an iPod.8 Unsurprisingly, the students who
owned more music were more likely to own an iPod. If I define students who have more than
1000 songs on their computers as music lovers and others as non-music lovers, 80% of music
lovers own an iPod, whereas only 60% of non-music lovers do.
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Conjoint Survey
Choice First Choice (%) Second Choice (%)
iPod 46.11% 28.50%
Computer 36.63% 37.23%
Radio 17.27% 34.28%
N=10608.
Table 5 shows that in the first sub-task of the conjoint survey, iPod was the most popular
of the three choices, with computer coming second.
An iPod was students’ first choice almost half of the time. Not only did they show a preference
for iPods, but they also prefered lower prices. Table 6 shows that when iPod or music prices
decreased, iPods were the first choice more often.
Table 6: iPod as First Choice under Extreme Attribute Levels
Attribute Lowest level Highest level
iPod price 56.75% 42.21%
Price per song in iTunes 74.22% 42.37%
Price per CD 66.88% 39.66%
Probability of getting caught 85% 23.89%
Fine per song 85% 39.22%
GB 53.04% 53.51%
N=10608.
As noted, I included the second sub-task in the conjoint survey in two of the seven classes.
Of the approximately 884 students surveyed, 270 completed surveys with the second sub-task.
These 270 students have similar characteristics to the overall sample.
4 Music Demand
I used the data from the second sub-task in the conjoint survey to estimate music demand. The
three dependent variables are CDs, iTunes songs, and pirated songs from P2P websites, and the
8Among the students who owned an MP3 player, more than 80% owned an iPod, which justifies my focus on
iPods specifically, instead of MP3 players generally, in this paper.
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independent variables are the prices of music from different sources and demographic variables.
As my first question in this study was whether music piracy hurts record sales, I needed to
determine the effect of pirated songs on CD and iTunes song consumption. The problem can
be expressed as a simultaneous equations problem. The simultaneous demands for music from
agent i in task t are
log Y ∗itp = z
′
itpγp + log(Y
∗
its)φps + log(Y
∗
itc)φpc + uitg (2)
log Y ∗its = z
′
itsγs + log(Y
∗
itp)φsp + log(Y
∗
itc)φsc + uits (3)
log Y ∗itc = z
′
itcγc + log(Y
∗
its)φcs + log(Y
∗
itp)φcp + uitc (4)
where subscripts p, s and c denote P2P (pirated songs), iTunes songs, and CDs. For g ∈ {p, s, c}
Y ∗g = Yg + 1, Yg is the consumption of g; zg is a vector of exogenous regressors, including prices,
that are uncorrelated with ug; and uitg are i.i.d. over i and t and homoskedastic, but correlated
across g. Table 7 presents all of the z.
Table 7: Exogenous Regressors in Music Demand
pi∗ = pi + 0.001 probability of getting caught
f∗ = f + 1 fine per song if caught
P ∗s price per iTunes song
P ∗c price per CD
iPod indicator for iPod
h∗ = h+ 1 hours spent on Internet per day
Antivirus indicator for having antivirus software
P2Pfd indicator for having friend who engages in piracy
Dorm indicator for living in dorm
Income level of income
Prob perceived probability of getting caught in real world
MusInt level of music interest
P2P ∗ illegal songs downloaded last month
iTunes∗ iTunes songs purchased last month
CD∗ CD purchased last month
Each dependent variable has its own instruments. For instance, the probability of getting
caught pirating music (pi) instruments for the demand for pirated music from P2P websites,
the price per song in iTunes instruments for the demand for iTunes songs; and the price per
CD instruments for CD demand. I used the three-stage least-square method to estimate this
simultaneous equations system, and the results are presented in Table 8.
There are several things to note. First, the students pirated more music when they owned
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Table 8: Music Demand/Month (std. err.)
log(P2P + 1) Demand/Month log(iTunes+ 1) Demand/Month log(CD + 1) Demand/Month
Constant 0.27 (0.19) 2.21 (0.07) 0.93 (0.04)
log Y ∗p -0.07 (0.01) -0.04(0.01)
log Y ∗s -0.33 (0.03) -0.09 (0.01)
log Y ∗c -0.02 (0.10) -0.09 (0.06)
iPod 0.37 (0.06) 0.14 (0.03)
log pi∗ -0.32 (0.01)
log f∗ -0.21 (0.01)
logP ∗s -1.82 (0.04)
logP ∗c -0.28 (0.01)
Antivirus 0.29 (0.12)
log h∗ -0.20 (0.07)
P2Pfd 0.06 (0.03)
Dorm 0.11 (0.06)
Income 0.05 (0.03)
Prob 0.05 (0.01)
MusInt 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)
MusInstr -0.004 (0.015)
logP2P ∗ 0.35 (0.01)
log iTunes∗ 0.23 (0.01)
logCD∗ 0.25 (0.01)
N=3240.
an iPod. Second, the law of demand holds, that is, the demand for music dropped when prices
increased. However, because I used a simultaneous equations system, the coefficients of price do
not fully reflect the effect of price changes on all three demands equations.
Table 9 shows how the demand for music from different sources changed when music prices
changed and when an iPod was not available . When students could not own an iPod, in
contrast to the real world in which 72% owned an iPod, they pirated 20.21% less music from
P2P websites, and consumed 7.77% fewer songs from iTunes, but consumed 1.8% more CDs.
Table 9: Percentage Change in Demand for Music with Price Changes
yP2P yiTunes yCD
pi(0.0001→ 0.0002) -2.83% 0.20% 0.10%
f ($100→ 200) -13.76% 1.03% 0.54%
Ps(0.99→ 1.09) 3.05% -8.73% 0.72%
Pc(15→ 16.5) -0.01% 0.22% -2.51%
To a “no-iPod” world -20.21% -7.77% 1.80%
The probability of getting caught and the payment of a fine are significant components of the
price of (or punishment for) pirating music. Students pirated less music when the punishment
was more severe. When the probability of getting caught increased 100% from 0.01% to 0.02%,
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students pirated 2.83% less music from P2P websites, and consumed 0.20% more songs from
iTunes and 0.10% more CDs. When the fine per song increased 100% from $100 to $200, students
pirated 13.76% less music from P2P websites, and consumed 1.03% more songs from iTunes and
0.54% more CDs.
Students bought fewer iTunes songs when these were more expensive. When the price per
song rose 10% from $0.99 to $1.09, they bought 8.73% fewer songs from iTunes. They also
pirated 3.05% more music from P2P websites and consumed 0.72% more CDs.
Similarly, student bought fewer CDs when CDs were more expensive. When the price of a
CD increased 10% from $15 to $16.5, they bought 2.51% fewer CDs. At the same time, they also
pirated approximately the same amount of music, but bought 0.22% more songs from iTunes.
My estimates are consistent with those of Shiller and Waldfogel (2011), who estimate the
demand for iTunes songs using survey data collected from 500 students. They find that when
the price of an iTunes song increases from $0.99 to $1.87, demand drops by 42% from 7434 to
4351. I identified a similar price effect on demand for iTunes songs using the estimates in Table
8. When the price of an iTunes song was increased from $0.99 to $1.87 in the survey, demand
drops 49%, which is reasonably close to the 42% in Shiller and Waldfogel (2011). At the same
time, I also found a price effect on the demand for other types of music. Students pirated 25%
more music and bought 6% more CDs in this case.
Note that record sales from different sources are substitutes for one another. When students
bought 10% more CDs, demand for iTunes songs decreased by 0.9%. At the same time, demand
for CDs decreased by 0.9% when consumption of iTunes songs increased by 10%. The emergence
of online music stores such as iTunes plays a role in the decline of revenue from CD sales.
Table 10: Piracy Elasticity of Sales (%)
Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf -0.00001
Rob and Waldfogel -0.13
Blackburn -0.18
This paper (CD sales) -0.04
This paper (iTunes sales) -0.07
Finally, it is clear that music piracy does hurt record sales.9 When students pirated 10% more
9Table 10 reports the piracy elasticity of sales. Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Rob and Waldfogel
(2006) report only estimates of the displacement effect of illegal downloads (P2P) on album sales. I combine those
estimates with their sample statistics on album consumption and illegal downloads to calculate the elasticities.
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music through P2P websites, they bought 0.7% fewer iTunes songs and 0.4% fewer CDs. This
result is both economically and statistically significant and contrary to the claim of Oberholzer-
Gee and Strumpf (2007), thereby corroborating the findings of other economists. Rob and
Waldfogel (2006) report that individuals buy 1.3% fewer records (including iTunes songs and
CDs) when they pirate 10% more music, whereas Blackburn (2004) suggests a higher number:
people buy 1.8% fewer records when they pirate 10% more music.
5 Discrete-Choice Demand for iPods
The results in Section 4 suggest that music piracy does hurt record sales. Before quantifying
the welfare implications of the three copyright regimes, I here build a discrete-choice demand
model for iPods to quantify the complementary relationships between music and iPods.
In each of the 12 first sub-tasks in the conjoint survey, students were asked to rank three
options for listening to music: an iPod, a computer, and the radio (which I treat as an out-
side good). These rankings served as the students’ choices, and thus constitute the dependent
variables in the demand estimation.
Students would generally be expected to have a rough estimate of their music consumption
before they purchased an iPod. The average lifetime of an iPod is two years, and students would
only buy one if they thought they would buy or pirate a considerable amount of music in those
two years. I thus entered the estimated demands for music from the previous section into the
indirect utility of a choice to account for how music complements that choice.10 The indirect
utility of choice j for student i in task t is
Uijt = βij + αi,pricePjt + αi,gbGBjt + αi,p2p ˆP2Pijt + αi,itunes ˆiTunesijt + αi,cd ˆCDijt + ijt, (5)
where Pjt is the price of choice j in task t, GBjt is the capacity (in gigabytes) of choice j in task
t, and ijt is the usual i.i.d. logit error.
10I did not correct the standard errors in the second-stage estimation of discrete demand. In other words, I
treat the estimated demands for music as true demands.
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We can express the demand parameters of student i in Equation (5) as
Θi ≡ [βi1; βi2;αi,price;αi,gb;αi,p2p;αi,itunes;αi,cd],
where Θi is a 1 × 7 vector of individual parameters. Θ is a ni × 7 matrix whose ith row is Θi,
and ni is the number of students in the sample. Define Xjt as a 1 × 7 vector of covariates in
Equation (5), and we can then express the indirect utility as
Uijt = ΘiXjt + ijt. (6)
The likelihood that student i will choose j in task t takes the following logit form.
Prijt =
exp(Uijt)∑
k exp(Uikt) + 1
. (7)
As Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2000), Petrin (2002) and Rossi, Allenby,
and McCulloch (2005) argue, random coefficient models generate better estimates of consumer
demands than do homogenous coefficient models. In this data set, it is natural to consider
that the students have heterogeneous coefficients. For instance, an average student may be
more responsive to iPod price changes than an iPod lover, which translates into a higher price
coefficient (in absolute value) for the average student.
I follow Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005) in using a hierarchical Bayesian model with a
mixture of five components of normal priors to estimate the random coefficients. This approach
is more flexible than the classical approach because it does not restrict the coefficients to coming
from a normal distribution. Moreover, this approach allows for correlated coefficients without
additional computation time.
Because the students provided demographic information in the survey, I include aspects of
that information in the demand model to account for the observed heterogeneity across students.
Define Zi as a 1 × nz vector of the demographic characteristics of student i, where nz is the
number of such characteristics. Define Z as an ni×nz matrix. The demand model, in which the
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unobserved heterogeneity is distributed as a K mixture of normal, can be expressed as follows.
Uijt = ΘiXjt + ijt
Θi = Zi4+ ui
ui ∼ N(µindi ,Σindi)
indi ∼ MultinomialK(γ)
γ is a vector giving the mixture probabilities for each of the K components. The complete
specification with priors over the mixture probabilities (α), mean (µ¯ and a−1µ ), and covariance
matrices (v and V ) is
γ ∼ Dirichlet(α)
µk|Σk ∼ N(µ¯,Σk × a−1µ )
Σk ∼ IW (v, V )
{µk,Σk} independent
5.1 Estimation
I follow Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005) in using a hybrid of Gibbs sampling and the
Metropolis-Hasting method to implement posterior inference for this model. I use a hybrid
Metropolis method that employs customized Metropolis candidate density to draw Θi for each
student. Conditional on Θi, I use an unconstrained Gibbs sampler to draw δ, µk, and Σk.
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In particular, I alternately obtain draws between the individual-level parameters in (8) and
hyperparameters in (9):12
Θi|indi, Zi4, µindi ,Σindi (8)
γ, ind,4, {µk}, {Σk}|{Θ} (9)
11Constraints must be imposed on the Gibbs sampler to fix an identification problem called “label switching” if
inference is desired for the mixture component parameters. This is not a problem here because I am interested in
estimating individual student parameters and their distribution across students alone. An unconstrained Gibbs
sampler is enough to ensure identification. See Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005) for more details.
12Interested readers can find the details of the implementation of the MCMC draws in Chapter 5 of Rossi,
Allenby, and McCulloch (2005).
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The conditional posterior in (8) is proportional to the product of the likelihood in (7) and
the prior of the hyperparameters. I use the Random-Walk Metropolis to obtain the draws of Θi.
The draws of the hyperparameters in (9) can be broken down into a succession of conditional
draws as follows.
ind|γ, Z,4, {µk,Σk}, {Θ} (10)
γ|ind (11)
{µk,Σk}|ind,Θ (12)
4|ind, Z, {µk,Σk},Θ, (13)
where the draw of the indicators in (10) is a multinomial draw based on the likelihood ratios
with γk as the prior probability of membership in each component. The draw of γ given ind
in (11) is a Dirichlet draw. The draw of each (µk,Σk) in (12) can be made using a standard
algorithm to draw from a multivariate regression model. The draw of 4 in (13) requires that
the pooling of data from all K components into one regression model.
5.2 Estimates
Table 11: Heterogeneity Improves Fit
Log Marginal Density
Homogenous Coef. -15786.634
1 Component -11870.235
5 Components -10960.389
Table 11 reports the log marginal density for alternative model specifications. The model’s
posterior probability is monotone in the log marginal density. Hence, a higher log marginal
density means a better fit. Note also that log marginal density includes an automatic penalty
for the addition of additional parameters (Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005)). Heterogeneity
leads to a substantial improvement in fit. In addition, a more flexible distribution of parameters
fits the data better. The estimates from the five-component mixture model yield a higher log
marginal density than those from the one-component model.
Figure 5 displays the density distribution of the coefficients, which indicates substantial
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Figure 5:
Density of Random Coefficients
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heterogeneity among students’ preferences. The five-component model is more flexible and is
able to capture the fatter tail of the preference distribution of some of the coefficients.
Table 12: Elasticity of iPod Demand
1 Component 5 Components
PiPod -0.229 -0.242
[-0.251, -0.208] [-0.283, -0.203]
pi -0.017 -0.017
[-0.018, -0.016] [-0.020, -0.015]
f -0.021 -0.022
[-0.022, -0.019] [-0.024, -0.019]
PiTunes 0.007 0.008
[-0.006, 0.008] [-0.006, 0.009]
Pcd -0.013 -0.010
[-0.016, -0.009] [-0.013, -0.007]
The 5th and 95th percentiles of the estimates are reported in brackets.
Students’ demand for iPod is not elastic. Table 12 shows that iPod’s own price elasticity
ranges between -0.229 and -0.242 under different specifications. Music consumption and the iPod
are complements to each other: iPod demand decreases if music prices increase. The elasticities
of iPod demand with respect to the prices of music from different sources are all below -0.01%.
6 Counterfactual Experiments
The results in Section 4 suggest that music piracy hurts record sales, and those in Section 5
suggest that it increases demand for, and thus the revenue from, iPods. In this section, I discuss
how demand for music and iPods would change in three different copyright regimes, which may
shed light on the direction of future copyright policies.
The three copyright regimes are as follows.
Current Regime: In this regime, the RIAA uses the No Electronic Theft Act to occa-
sionally file lawsuits against P2P software companies and individual music pirates. In the first
decade of this century, two of the largest P2P software companies, Napster and Kazaa, were
sued and later forced to shut down. Between September 2003 and June 2005, 11,700 music
pirates were sued (Associated Press (2005)). This wave of lawsuits, however, turned out to have
no lasting effect. After a slight decrease in music piracy immediately following the rulings, the
number of music pirates began to grow again.
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No Music Piracy Regime: In this regime, the government would increase the penalties
for music piracy with the aim of eradicating it, which would provide music producers with
sufficient income and incentive to create music. Eradicating music piracy would be difficult, but
it would be possible if Internet service providers cooperated. Currently there are proposals in
France and Britain urging Internet service providers to band together voluntarily to crack down
on pirate subscribers.
Free Music Regime: In this regime, music piracy would be legal, and music from all
sources would be free. The idea of legalizing music piracy is not new. Fisher (2004) and Netanel
(2003) propose a copyright regime in which it is legal to share music files, but firms such as
Apple, which would benefit from the boost in iPod sales, would have to pay royalties to the
music industry. Such royalties are similar to the private copying levy, a government-mandated
scheme in which a levy is charged on transactions involving recordable media. In the U.S.,
the levy applies to stand-alone CD recorders and portable satellite radio recording devices.
Analyzing the demand for music and the demand for iPods can shed light on the range of
possible royalties to be imposed on iPods and other MP3 players.
Table 13: Product Attributes in All Regimes
Product Attributes Current No Music Piracy Free Music-Royalty
Regime Regime Regime
Price per iPod $200 $200 $200
Price per iTunes song $0.99 $0.99 $0
Price per CD $15 $15 $0
pi (in %) 0.01 100 0
Fine per song $30 $10,000 $0
Table 13 gives the product attributes in the three regimes. The Current Regime describes
the current music world. I mimic the current copyright system of the U.S. government and the
RIAA’s approach with a low probability of getting caught and a small fine for pirating music.
At the time the survey was conducted, an 8-gigabyte iPod cost $200, and iTunes songs and CDs
cost $0.99 and $15, respectively.
The government and the RIAA would impose a more severe penalty on music piracy in the
No Music Piracy Regime. Those engaging in it would be caught for sure, and they would have
to pay $10,000 for every song they illegally downloaded.
In the Free Music Regime, downloading music online would free and legal and CDs would
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cost $5 to cover the marginal cost of production (I varied this amount from $1 to $7, but my
main conclusion remained unchanged).
Table 14: Changes in Monthly Music Consumption from Current Regime
To Free Music Regime No Music Piracy Regime
P2P ↑ 690% ↓ 100%
iTunes ↑ 70% ↑ 42%
CD ↑ 29% ↑ 24%
Overall Songs ↑ 527% ↓ 68%
In calculating the changes in overall song consumption, I assumed each CD contained 10 songs.
Table 14 reports the changes in the consumption of music from the Current Regime to the
two other regimes. When online music becomes free and CDs are sold at a marginal cost in
the Free Music Regime, the overall consumption of music increases by more than 500%. When
there is no music piracy, the consumption of legally purchased increases, with demand for iTunes
songs, and CDs increasing by 42% and 24%, respectively. In other words, music piracy reduces
record sales by 24% to 42%. However, because the average student pirates more music than he
would consume, the overall consumption of music decreases by 68%.
Table 14 sheds light on how students’ probability of purchasing an iPod varies across the
regimes. In the Free Music Regime, in which the demand for music is much higher than that
in the Current Regime, we should see an increase in the demand for iPods. In the No Music
Piracy Regime, in which overall music consumption drops by 68%, we should see a drop in iPod
demand.
Table 15: iPod Purchase Probability in Different Regimes (in %)
Current Regime Free Music Regime No Music Piracy Regime
Predicted Market Share 53.04 70.66 46.75
[51.58, 54.45] [69.49, 71.78] [45.15, 48.39]
The 5th and 95th percentiles of the estimates are reported in brackets.
Table 15 shows students’ iPod purchase probabilities are consistent with the changes in music
consumption in the different regimes. On average, students would be approximately 18% more
likely to buy an iPod in the Free Music Regime than in the Current Regime because of the
increase in overall music consumption. That would translate into a $36 increase in expected
revenue from each student.
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When the average student’s overall music consumption decreases in the No Music Piracy
Regime, he becomes approximately 6% less likely to buy an iPod. Put another way, in this
scenario, approximately 12% of Apple’s revenue from iPods comes from the additional music
consumption realized by music piracy. Using Apple’s iPod revenue in 2008 ($9.2 billion) as a
reference, we can estimate that $1.1 billion of the company’s revenue that year came from music
piracy.
7 Conclusion
I answer two important empirical questions regarding music piracy in this paper. First, does
music piracy hurt record sales, and, if so, by how much? Second, does music piracy benefit the
sales of music complements, such as iPods and, if so, by how much? I answer these questions
using a unique conjoint survey data set. Estimates from three-stage least-squares estimation
indicate that music piracy does indeed hurt record sales, which corroborates the prevailing belief
in the music industry, but is contrary to the claim of Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007). I also
use a Bayesian approach to estimate the demand for iPods and find that music piracy benefits
iPod sales. If there were no music piracy, Apple’s revenue from iPod sales would decrease by
12%, which would have translated to $1.1 billion in 2008. If music were free, however, then
Apple’s expected revenue would increase by $36 per student.
In addition to iPods, many other products are also music complements and thus would benefit
from a free music regime. Examples include other brands of MP3 players, Internet providers,
and live music performances. Although I only focus on iPods in this paper, my approach could
easily be extended to examine the complementary relationships between music and these other
products. This extension would make possible the evaluation of the effects of different copyright
regimes on different products.
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